UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-28-2017

State v. Moore Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44613

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Moore Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44613" (2017). Not Reported. 3678.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/3678

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9263
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
ADRIENNE MOORE FKA ARNAIZ,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________)

NO. 44613
BLAINE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-612
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found Adrienne Arnaiz violated
the terms of her probation. The district court subsequently revoked her probation and
executed her underlying sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, for grand theft.
Ms. Arnaiz appeals.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In December of 2015, Ms. Arnaiz pled guilty to one count of grand theft by
embezzlement. (R., pp.106, 121.) Ms. Arnaiz was employed by a woman to care for the
woman’s dogs and perform other personal assistant tasks. (Presentence Investigation
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Report (“PSI”),1 pp.4–5.) Ms. Arnaiz used the woman’s credit card and pre-signed
checks for personal purchases without the woman’s permission, such as buying items
online and paying for car maintenance. (PSI, pp.4–5.) In February of 2016, the district
court sentenced Ms. Arnaiz to ten years, with four years fixed, suspended her sentence,
and placed her on probation. (R., pp.118–19, 121–24.) This was her first felony offense.
(PSI, p.6.)
About six months later, in August of 2016, the State petitioned to revoke
Ms. Arnaiz’s probation. (R., pp.133–34.) The State claimed Ms. Arnaiz violated her
probation by failing to obey state law. (R., pp.140–41.) Ms. Arnaiz allegedly shoved her
mother and pushed her step-father to the ground during an argument at her parents’
house. (R., pp.140–41.) She was arrested for a battery. (R., p.140.) The district court
held an evidentiary hearing and found Ms. Arnaiz committed a willful probation violation.
(R., pp.170–72; Tr., p.89, L.11–p.99, L.3 (district court’s findings).)
At the disposition hearing, the State recommended the district court retain
jurisdiction (a “rider”). (Tr., p.111, Ls.23–25.) Ms. Arnaiz requested the district court
reinstate her probation with additional local jail time. (Tr., p.117, Ls.10–13.) The district
court rejected both recommendations. The district court revoked Ms. Arnaiz’s probation
and executed her ten-year sentence. (Tr., p.126, Ls.13–19.) The district court also
declined to reduce Ms. Arnaiz’s sentence sua sponte. (Tr., p.123, L.7–p.124, L.19.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Arnaiz’s probation and
executed her underlying sentence of ten years, with four years fixed?
1

Citations to the PSI refer to the fifty-seven page electronic document containing the
confidential sentencing materials.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Arnaiz’s Probation And
Executed Her Underlying Sentence Of Ten Years, With Four Years Fixed
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant’s probation
under certain circumstances. I.C. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a twostep analysis to review a probation revocation proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho
102, 105 (2009). First, the Court determines “whether the defendant violated the terms
of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in fact violated
the terms of his probation,” the Court examines “what should be the consequences of
that violation.” Id. The determination of a probation violation and the determination of
the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation
and pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy,
113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,”
however. State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to
give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and
supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to
revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is meeting the objective of
rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127
Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may consider the defendant’s conduct before
and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).
In this case, Ms. Arnaiz asserts the district court abused its discretion by revoking
her probation. For her first probation violation on her first felony offense, the district
court should have retained jurisdiction or imposed additional jail time. These alternative
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sanctions would have provided adequate punishment for the violation while also
allowing Ms. Arnaiz to continue her rehabilitative efforts.
Ms. Arnaiz has significant mental health issues and physical ailments that are
best treated in the community, rather than in prison. She has been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), borderline personality disorder, anxiety disorder,
and bipolar disorder. (PSI, pp.13–15, 33.) At the time of the alleged violation, Ms. Arnaiz
was being treated for PTSD, panic and anxiety, and premenstrual dysphoric syndrome
at St. Luke’s Psychiatric Wellness Center. (Conf. Exs.,2 pp.1–3.) Her nurse practitioner
opined that Ms. Arnaiz’s interaction with her mother triggered some traumatic memories
and feelings,3 which led to her “strong physical reaction” in committing the battery.
(Conf. Exs., p.2.) The nurse reported that Ms. Arnaiz’s symptoms have “significantly
improved” through therapy and medication. (Conf. Exs., p.2.) Ms. Arnaiz also attended
the SMART Recovery Groups at the PEER Wellness Center in Boise. (Conf. Exs., pp.4,
7; PSI, p.36.) She was an “active participant” and completed the online training course
to become a facilitator of her support group. (Conf. Exs., p.4.) The executive director of
the PEER Wellness Center described Ms. Arnaiz as motivated, determined, and an
inspiration to others in the program. (Conf. Exs., p.4.) Similarly, a PEER Support
Specialist wrote that Ms. Arnaiz worked to change her way of thinking and became a
positive influence for others in the program. (Conf. Exs., p.7.) Ms. Arnaiz’s efforts to
treat her mental health issues demonstrate that she could succeed in the community on
probation.
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Citations to the confidential exhibits refer to the eleven-page electronic document
containing medical records and letters submitted by Ms. Arnaiz for disposition.
3
Ms. Arnaiz was sexually abused as a child by her previous step-father. (PSI, p.8.)
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In addition of Ms. Arnaiz’s mental health issues, she has physical ailments that
require medical attention and continued treatment. Ms. Arnaiz has a condition that
causes painful blisters on her hands and feet as well as psoriatic arthritis. (PSI, p.15.)
She obtained a grant for Stelara injections to help with the condition, but she had
completed only two of the eight cycles of treatment at the time of the disposition
hearing. (PSI, p.15; Tr., p.114, L.23–p.115, L.22.) The injections are akin to
chemotherapy because they weaken the immune system for two to three weeks at a
time. (Tr., p.115, Ls.4–11, p.117, L.20–p.118, L.6.) Due to the side effects, it is not
advantageous to receive these injections in prison. (Tr., p.117, L.20–p.118, L.6.)
Ms. Arnaiz also has hearing issues and possibly an undiagnosed brain tumor.
(Tr., p.115, L.24–p.116, L.2; PSI, p.57.) In light of Ms. Arnaiz’s mental health and
physical issues, the district court should have imposed a lesser sanction to allow for
Ms. Arnaiz to continue treatment with her current health providers. A lesser sanction
such as additional jail time or a rider would serve as an appropriate deterrent and
punishment without disrupting her treatment.
Further, Ms. Arnaiz’s strong support system, new housing, and new employment
show that she has the tools to succeed on probation. Ms. Arnaiz has a very supportive
husband. (PSI, p.11; Conf. Exs., p.5.) He attended support groups and counseling
sessions with her on a regular basis. (Conf. Exs., p.5.) He also stated that Ms. Arnaiz
has dedicated herself to recovery and therapy over the last two years, (Conf. Exs., p.5.)
In addition to the support of her husband, Ms. Arnaiz provided a letter of support from
her former mother-in-law and a long-term friend. (Conf. Exs., pp.6, 8.) Her former
mother-in-law stated that she had never seen Ms. Arnaiz angry or threaten others.
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(Conf. Exs., p.6.) She wrote that Ms. Arnaiz had supported her during difficult times.
(Conf. Exs., p.6.) Likewise, Ms. Arnaiz’s friend described her as compassionate, patient,
and having a positive impact on others. (Conf. Exs., p.8.) Her friend was confident
Ms. Arnaiz would “take every experience as an opportunity to learn and grow.” (Conf.
Exs., p.8.) Along with her support system, Ms. Arnaiz and her husband recently
obtained new housing and employment. They relocated to Mountain View RV Park and
were hired as park managers. (Tr., p.113, L.21–p.114, L.19, p.120, L.21–p.121, L.16.)
As managers, the RV park would cover their housing and utility costs and provide a
salary. (Tr., p.121, L.23–p.121, L.8.) With that salary and her husband’s income,
Ms. Arnaiz would be able to pay for additional medical treatment and, most importantly,
pay the costs of supervision and restitution. (Tr., p.121, Ls.1–8.)
In light of these facts, Ms. Arnaiz submits the district court’s decision to sentence
her to ten years in prison, with four years fixed, for her first probation violation (and first
felony offense) was an abuse of discretion. The district court should have given her
another opportunity to demonstrate her commitment to success on probation, with
additional local jail time or a rider as a sanction for her violation. At this point, revocation
was an unnecessarily harsh punishment that inhibited her mental health treatment and
likely aggravated her physical condition while also preventing her from becoming a
productive, contributing member of society.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Arnaiz respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
revoking her probation and remand this case with instructions to reinstate probation or
hold a new disposition hearing.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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